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Who Should Bear the Cost of China’s Carbon Emissions 
Embodied in Goods for Exports? 
By ZhongXiang Zhang, Research Program, East-West Center 
 
Summary 
China’s capital-intensive, export-oriented, spectacular economic growth since launching its 
open-door policy and economic reforms in late 1978 not only has created jobs and has lifted 
millions of the Chinese people out of poverty, but also has given rise to unprecedented 
environmental pollution and CO2 emissions. While estimates of the embedded CO2 
emissions in China’s trade differ, both single country studies for China and global studies 
show a hefty chunk of China’s CO2  emissions embedded in trade. This portion of CO2 
emissions had helped to turn China into the world’s largest carbon emitter, and is further 
widening its gap with the second largest emitter. This raises the issue of who should be 
responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon cost of exports. China 
certainly wants importers to cover some, if not all, of those costs. While China’s stance is 
understandable, this paper has argued from a broad and balanced perspective that if this is 
pushed too far, it will not help to find solutions to this issue. On the contrary it can be to 
China’s disadvantage for a number of reasons. However, aligning this responsibility with 
China does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on domestic actions. In that context, the 
paper recommends specific actions that need to be taken internationally as well as 
domestically in order to effectively control the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade. 
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China’s capital-intensive, export-oriented, spectacular economic growth since launching 
its open-door policy and economic reforms in late 1978 not only has created jobs and has 
lifted millions of the Chinese people out of poverty, but also has given rise to 
unprecedented environmental pollution and CO2 emissions. While estimates of the 
embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ, both single country studies for China 
and global studies show a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 emissions embedded in trade. This 
portion of CO2 emissions had helped to turn China into the world’s largest carbon emitter, 
and is further widening its gap with the second largest emitter. This raises the issue of 
who should be responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon cost of 
exports. China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not all, of that costs. While 
China’s stance is understandable, this paper has argued from a broad and balanced 
perspective that if this is pushed too far, it will not help to find solutions to this issue. On 
the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage for a number of reasons. However, aligning 
this responsibility with China does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on domestic 
actions. In that context, the paper recommends specific actions that need to be taken 
internationally as well as domestically in order to effectively control the embedded CO2 
emissions in China’s trade. 
 
 
Keywords: Carbon emissions embodied in trade; Consumption-based accounting; 
Production-based accounting; Processing trade; Carbon tariffs; Energy policy 
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1 Prepared for Resources, Energy and Eco-Innovation, a special issue of Mineral 
Economics, Springer.    2
1. Introduction 
China had been the world’s second largest carbon emitter behind the U.S. for years. 
Based on the trends in the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. EIA (2004) estimated that China’s 
CO2 emissions are not expected to catch up with the world’s largest carbon emitter by 
2030. This seems to have been implanted in people’s minds until the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) indicated in April 2007 that China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s 
largest carbon emitter in 2007 or 2008. The Chinese senior official at the National 
Coordination Committee on Climate Change immediately rebutted that claim, criticizing 
the lack of statistical evidence. Yet that IEA claim is an estimate for the future, based on 
current trends. Although the time span for such an estimate is as short as one year or two 
years, it is not the historical statistics on carbon emissions. So using a lack of statistical 
basis to reject that claim is not compelling (Zhang 2007b). This early remark by the IEA 
had been incorporated into the findings of its flagship report World Energy Outlook 2007, 
reaffirming that China was already ranked number one as the world’s largest carbon 
emitter in 2007 (IEA 2007). Another study estimates that China’s CO2 emissions 
surpassed those of the U.S. by 8% in 2006 (MNP 2007).  
China’s high absolute CO2 emission levels are the combined effects of a large 
population and a coal-fueled, rapidly growing economy. Being the workshop of the world 
also leads to a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 emissions embedded (or embodied, which is 
used inter-exchangeably throughout this paper) in goods that are exported to 
industrialized countries as well as to other developing countries (e.g., IEA 2007; Davis 
and Caldeira 2010;
 Peters and Hertwich 2008; Peters et al. 2011; Shui and Harriss 2006; 
Weber et al. 2008). Following brief discussion on the magnitude of China’s CO2 
emissions embodied in trade, this paper will focus on the issue of who should be 
responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon cost of exports. This is a 
very sensitive and complex issue. China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not 
all, of the costs of that. While China’s stance is understandable, this paper has argued 
from a broad and balanced perspective that if this is pushed too far, it will not help to find 
solutions to this issue. On the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage for a number of 
reasons.  
However, assigning China’s responsibility for its carbon emissions embodied in 
exports does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on domestic actions. To effectively 
control the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade, actions need to be taken 
internationally as well as domestically. At the domestic level, the paper suggests that 
China needs to focus on restructuring and rebalancing its economy through adjusting 
some policies including pro-trade policies, upgrading its trade structure and energy mix, 
improving energy efficiency, and strengthening the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental regulations and standards to prod companies to take increasing corporate 
social responsibility. At the international level, China and the international community 
need to strengthen coordination in the internalization of the carbon costs, ensuring that 
the costs of carbon emissions embodied in traded goods be reflected in the price to the 
consuming countries as well as those goods for domestic use. This is a feasible means of 
passing through a carbon cost to consumers without consumption-based accounting of 
CO2 emissions. Moreover, given that developing countries have explicitly linked progress 
in climate finance commitments from industrialized countries with many other issues in 
international climate change negotiations, the paper concludes that the delivery of their   3
climate finance pledges will not only help build trust with their developing country 
counterparts and break current impasses in international climate change negotiations, but 




2. How significantly CO2 emissions embodied in trade and China’s contribution? 
Under the accounting rules of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), all 
greenhouse gas emissions and removals are based on in-country production emissions. 
Commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and its follow-up regimes are set and evaluated based on 
this territorial-based emissions accounting system. 
While Wyckoff and Ropp (1994) raised the trade-related emissions issue by 
estimating the emissions embodied in manufactured imports of six OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, it is only recently that the issue 
of consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions has begun to emerge in analytical 
literature serving the debate on the future climate change regime. Two examples are the 
OECD study by Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) and the OECD Roundtable on Sustainable 
Development study (Harrison et al. 2003) on embodied CO2 emissions in international 
trade. The two studies conclude that the current focus on in-country production emissions 
alone tells only part of the story because a country’s global impact in sustainability terms 
may be distorted by the fact that current measures based on production emissions do not 
take into account embodied CO2 emissions in international trade. So a country’s 
measured emissions levels may be misleadingly low under the Kyoto accounting 
framework if it produces very few emissions but imports large quantities of goods whose 
production gives rise to significant emissions, indicating that a production-based 
indicator which does not take into account trade flows can give a misleading 
underestimation of the emissions caused by a country’s consumption patterns. At a 
minimum, these findings point out the importance of a better understanding of 
consumption trends so that efforts by industrialized countries to address climate change 
are not overestimated or overstated by focusing just on in-country production emissions – 
and correspondingly, that the global challenge ahead is not underestimated. 
In recognition of the importance of trade in regional emissions trends, a number 
of studies have since attempted to quantify the contribution of embodied CO2 emissions 
in international trade in more detail and with different geographical coverage. Recent 
studies of the most broadest country and sector coverage - one by Davis and Caldeira 
(2010) and another by Peters et al. (2011) - have quantified embodied CO2 emissions in 
global trade involving 113 countries and 57 economic sectors from 1990 to 2008. Peters 
et al. (2011) found that the CO2 emissions from the production of traded goods and 
services increased from 4.3 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 7.8 Gt CO2 in 2008. Measured as a 
percentage of global CO2 emissions, the contribution of embodied CO2 emissions rose to 
26% in 2008 from 20% in 1990 and 23% in 2004.  
China has often been taken as a case either in a single China country study or as a 
separate region in a global study, given China as the workshop of the world and its 
export-driven economy, which are expected to lead to a chunk of its emissions embedded 
in goods that are exported to industrialized countries as well as to other developing   4
countries. Estimates of the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ. They depend 
on the boundary assumed in the calculation of embedded CO2 emissions, the choice of 
methodology (top-down input-out analysis versus bottom-up production processes of 
specific products) and the treatment of technology and emission intensity data across 
trading partners. Country-specific, detailed energy and carbon intensity data and 
technology level required is crucial to the accuracy of the calculations. Simply assuming 
either all imports produced using Chinese domestic technologies or all Chinese exports 
produced using American domestic technologies (e.g., Shui and Harriss 2006) may 
overestimate or underestimate China’s CO2 emissions embedded in trade because it fails 
to capture potentially large national differences in technology levels across trading 
partners. For example, assuming that the imports were produced using Chinese domestic 
technologies, Peters et al. (2007) estimate CO2 emissions embedded in imports account 
for 34% of China’s total emissions in 2002. But a later and more accurate estimate based 
on the technology level in each exporting country puts a value at 6.6% (Peters and 
Hertwich 2008). 
It should be pointed out that although these studies adopt different methodologies 
and use different datasets, they tend to draw similar conclusions. That is, given that 
foreign trade has shown a remarkable growth in China, China is by far the largest net 
exporter of CO2 emissions. Davis and Caldeira (2010) show that net exports accounted 
for 22.5% of production-based CO2 emissions in China in 2004. Peters et al. (2011) find 
that Chinese emissions accounted for 55% of the growth in global CO2 emissions from 
1990 to 2008 and the production of Chinese exports accounted for 18% of the growth in 
global CO2 emissions. Another observation is that, measured as a percentage of total CO2 
emissions produced in China, a single country study for China tends to give a higher 
estimate for the embedded CO2 emissions than those global studies based on more 
accurate country trade flow and technology details. Pan et al. (2008) estimate China’s 
CO2 emissions embodied in trade at 19% in 2001 and 30% in 2006 of its production-
based emissions. By contrast, Figure 1 shows China’s CO2 emissions, both production- 
and consumption-based, and its net emission transfers as a percentage of total production-
based emissions from 1990 to 2008 from a comprehensive global study based on more 
accurate country trade flow and technology details of 113 countries and 57 economic 
sectors. Given rapid increases in China’s trade since its accesses to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2001 (Figure 2), as would be expected, China’s CO2 
emissions, both production- and consumption-based, have been increasing rapidly since 
2002 (Figures 1-2). Coincidentally, it is since 2002 that China reversed a decline trend in 
its energy intensity which had gripped over the last two decades in the past century, 
experiencing faster energy consumption growth than economic growth (see Figure 3). It 
would be silly to blame this on the U.S., but if the U.S. had not withdrawn from the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, for its own competiveness concerns alone then the U.S. would 
have kept the pressure on China just like it did immediately after Kyoto and is currently 
doing, and China’s actual greenhouse gas emissions would be lower than their current 
levels (Zhang 2011b). Moreover, the gap between the production- and consumption-
based CO2 emissions had been widening before the global financial crisis, with net 
emission transfer increasing from 11% in 2001 to 21% in 2007. While the global 
financial crisis had tempered the rapid growth of China’s trade, China’s CO2 emissions in 
trade still accounted for 19% of its total production-based emissions in 2008.    5
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Figure 1 China’s production- and consumption-based CO2 emissions (million tons) 
and net emission transfers as percentages of its production-based CO2 emissions, 
1990-2008 
Source: Drawn based on Peters et al. (2011). 
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Figure 2 China’s GDP, exports and CO2 emissions, 1990-2009 
Sources: Drawn based on Peters et al. (2011) and the United Nations Statistic Division 
(2010). 
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Figure 3 China’s energy intensity index and carbon intensity index (1980=100), 
1980-2007 
Sources: Drawn based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and Zhang (1997). 
 
 
3. Who should be responsible for China’s CO2 emissions embodied in trade? 
While estimates of the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ, both single 
country studies for China and global studies found a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 
emissions embedded in trade. This portion of CO2 emissions had helped to turn China 
into the world’s largest carbon emitter, and further widens its gap with the second largest 
emitter. This raises the issue of who should be responsible for this portion of emissions 
and bearing the carbon cost of exports (Ball 2009). Should the exporting countries be 
responsible for consumption needs of importing countries? This is a very sensitive and 
complex issue. However, this issue of whether the responsibility for externality caused by 
traded goods lies with producers or consumers is not new. It has perplexed international 
discussions on traded hardwoods for many years, where the externality may be 
distributed between the exporting country and the importing country. Another example is 
related to trade in the “virtual water”, which refers to the water used in the production 
processes of agricultural or industrial product (see the research program on Virtual Water 
Trade at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-
International Hydrological Programme (Hoekstra and Hung 2002; Chapagain and   8
Hoekstra 2003)). So a water-scarce country can import products that require a lot of 
water in their production (the so-called import of “virtual water” as opposed to import of 
real water), thus relieving the pressure on its own water resources. The dispute between 
China and the EU over the exports of coking coal in the first half of 2004 also had a 
nexus between producers and consumers. The EU closed many of its own coking plants 
for environmental reasons, but pressed China to supply coking coal for its steelmakers. 
The EU even threatened to take China to the WTO if China refused to revoke restrictions 
on exports by 14 May 2004 and thus allow the EU to import coking coal at previous 
levels.
2 
China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not complete, of the costs of 
that (China Daily 2009). This was raised by Ma Kai, the then Chairman of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planning agency 
overseeing national economic planning and climate response issues, at a press conference 
organized by the Information Office of the State Council on 4 June 2007 (NDRC 2007). 
China’s view is on the grounds that when a country’s CO2 emissions data for production 
is higher than that for consumption, the country is in effect emitting CO2 to meet the 
consumption needs of other countries. China’s stance is understandable. Pointing this out 
at least helps to have a better understanding of China’s emissions and their contributions, 
find solutions to address this issue and to bridge the gap between the concerns of China 
and developed countries. However, if China follows some analysts to push this too far, on 
the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage. Let me explain why. 
China as the workshop of the world is largely the result of a comparative 
advantage in the division of trade. Using less energy-efficient technologies to produce 
goods for domestic use and exports is also largely dictated by its current stage of 
development. Having said that, it is fair to say that rapidly rising carbon emissions and 
emissions embedded in exports are also the results of China’s own failure to keep the 
expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries under control and to implement 
its own set industrial restructuring and sustainable development policies on the one hand 
(Zhang 2007a, 2010a,c and 2011c) and its deliberate, pro-trade policies on the other hand. 
China has not only adopted the common pro-trade policies, such as the depressed 
exchange rate and export tax rebates, but has long used access to its unique giant 
customer base as bargaining chips to persuade (or “as leverage to force” as called by 
some U.S. law makers) foreign companies to open factories within its borders. China not 
only has been criticized for keeping its currency artificially low, but also has confronted 
with many disputes with its trading partners. They include and are not limited to the auto 
                                                 
2 Historically, conflicts over trade have almost always been about import barriers. It 
remains to be seen whether the current WTO rules are strong enough to resolve the 
growing number of disputes over restrictions on exports. The first test in the WTO is a 
complaint filed in 2009 by the U.S., the European Union and Mexico, challenging alleged 
Chinese export restrictions on nine key raw materials such as coke, bauxite, fluorspar and 
magnesium. A second, and much tougher test, will come if the U.S., the EU, Japan and 
other affected countries follow up by filing a WTO complaint challenging increasing 
Chinese restrictions on the export of rare earth elements (Bacchus 2010).   9
part tariffs (see Box 1), the 70% local content requirement for wind power projects,
3 the 
export quotas on nine metal ores and other raw materials, and the export quotas on rare 
earths. While China may not admit it, all these policies are partly, if not completely, 
intended to encourage foreign companies, in particular high-tech companies to move 
production to China.
4 With criticisms from and complaints by its trading partners, China 
eventually abolished its policies on the auto part tariffs and the local content requirement 
for wind power projects. Responding to a complaint by the United States, the European 
Union and Mexico, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruled on 5 July 2011 that the 
quotas imposed by China on exports of nine metal ores and other raw materials vital to 
steel, chemical, aluminum and other industries violate international trade rules (WTO 
2011).  
At the core of this raw materials case is whether the WTO will allow export 
restrictions to be used to protect the environment, an argument China has used to justify 
limits on exports, including of rare earth ores under GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) Article XX. The raw materials panel concluded that since China’s 
WTO agreement did not specifically invoke GATT rules for export duties relating to 
these products, China can not now base its defense on a GATT provision. The Dispute 
Settlement Panel went on to say that even if an environmental defense were available in 
such cases, China did not meet the legal burden of proving such a defense in the raw 
materials dispute (WTO 2011). To justify that those restrictions would contribute to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and human health, China needs to 
demonstrate that it imposed these export restrictions in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption of the raw materials so as to conserve the raw 
materials. Put simply, in claiming an environmental defense, China needs to demonstrate 
while it has limited exports to foreigners, whether it has simultaneously taken steps to 
limit domestic production or consumption, which is required under the GATT rule for 
such an environmental defense. China’s Ministry of Commence states that China will 
follow the WTO provisions, applying the same policy to domestic consumption of these 
materials in China as that to foreign ones. This case does not touch on rare earths 
specifically, but the facts and legal concepts are very similar between the raw materials 
case and rare earths. However, no formal case has yet been brought concerning rare 
earths because the affected countries are closely watching the final resolution of the raw 
materials case. China has appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. Its final ruling will be a 
decisive factor for the U.S., the European Union and Japan to determine whether to file a 




                                                 
3 This requirement means that wind power projects must have over 70% of their turbine 
components locally made, and that the wind turbine generator must be assembled in 
China. See Zhang (2010c and 2011c) for further discussion. 
4 Until Western governments, business groups and media began pointing out the issues of 
WTO consistency, Chinese officials had repeatedly stated that the policies were intended 
to encourage companies to move production to China. They switched to emphasizing 
environmental protection as the trade issues became salient (Bradsher 2011).   10
BOX 1 CHINA’S DISPUTE ON AUTOMOBILE PART TARIFFS UNDER WTO  
 
China lost its first-ever dispute with World Trade Organization on 18 July 2008, when a 
panel on the WTO compliance of its auto part tariffs found in favor of the complainants – 
Canada, the EU and the U.S. China imposed in April 2005 a 25% tariff on imported auto 
parts, if the parts made up 60% or more of the value of a whole vehicle (Shen et al. 2008; 
WTO 2009). This tariff rate equals the duty that China applies on imported automobiles 
but exceeds its 10% tariff ceiling on imported auto parts. China had contended that the 
higher tariff was necessary to prevent tax evasion by companies that import whole cars as 
spare parts and then assemble them together inside China to avoid the higher tariffs 
applicable to entire automobiles. However, the three complainants in the case maintained 
that these higher charges unfairly discriminate against the use of foreign auto parts and 
effectively subsidize domestic production. The complainants argued that the tariff not 
only discouraged auto manufactures in China from using the imported parts, but also that 
the higher tariff put pressure on foreign producers of auto parts to relocate manufacturing 
facilities to China. On 15 September 2008, China notified its decision to appeal to the 
Appellate Body. On 15 December 2008, the Appellate Body reports were circulated to 
Members, upholding the Dispute Settlement Panel’s findings (WTO 2009). As a response 
to the WTO decision, China decided since 1 September 2009 to give up this practice that 
had been implemented for the past four years and to impose a uniform 10% tariff on all 
imported auto parts (NDRC et al. 2009). Given the fact that Chinese auto manufactures 
tend to produce cars with engines smaller than 2.5 liters and an amazing coincidence of 
timing (the decision to make a large, upward adjustment in consumption tax for gas-
guzzler cars since 1 September 2008 (see Table 1) was less than a month after China lost 
its WTO dispute), this move may be seen as a way for China to cut car imports without 
offending the WTO.  
 
 
Fundamentally speaking, no one/country forces China to produce a 
disproportionate amount of goods for exports. On the contrary, the U.S. and other 
countries, as well as economists such as Paul Krugman (2009), have accused China for 
creating an imbalance of world trade by the artificial depression of its exchange rate to 
promote its exports, although they may exaggerate the extent of China’s influence 
(UNCTAD 2011)
 5 and it is still questionable whether China’s practice can be adjudicated 
to be “manipulation” under international law (Staiger and Sykes 2010). If one follows 
China’s argument that these are European and American emissions, then it can be equally 
                                                 
5 UNCTAD (2011) in its policy brief recommends the use of the real effective exchange 
rate as a practical and effective indicator to differentiate between sustainable and 
unsustainable trade imbalances. It argues that a real effective exchange rate based on unit 
labor costs is better suited to grasp changes in competitiveness than one based on 
consumer price inflation. The latter misses out important elements of the catching-up 
process of developing countries and may result in significant misinterpretation for some 
important emerging economies like China.   11
argued that these must have been European and American jobs.
6 That puts globalization, 
jobs and climate change into the same dispute, and here you have the makings of a nasty 
trade flight (The Economist 2008). Given that job outsourcing in the current economic 
crisis is extremely sensitive in the U.S. and EU, this does not do any good for China. In 
particular, the U.S. has already had huge trade deficit with China, and has concerned 
about further deterioration of its trade balance sheet with China. Pushing the 
responsibility of the consumers in importing countries is definitely a tough sell to the 
U.S. It may well be taken out of the context and be used to tackle China for other real 
matters.
7 Thus, China needs to treat, with caution, any issue that may potentially worsen 
or relate to the trade deficit that it has with the U.S. Given that most carbon-intensive 
industries in the U.S. run a substantial trade deficit (Houser et al. 2008), the U.S. may 
well argue that imposing carbon tariffs and/or pushing for China to take on carbon 
emissions caps as early as 2020 aims to reduce CO2 emissions embedded in goods 




Table 1 Consumption tax rates for cars in China 
 
Engine (liters)  Excise tax since 1 
January 1994 (%) 
Excise tax since 1 
April 2006 (%) 
Excise tax since 1 
September 2008 (%)
1.0 or less 
1.0 < engine ≤ 1.5 
1.5 < engine ≤ 2.0 
2.0 < engine ≤ 2.5 
2.5 < engine ≤ 3.0 
3.0 < engine ≤ 4.0 























Source: Zhang (2010c). 
 
 
                                                 
6 This is not just about China versus industrialized countries. There is a bearing on 
developing countries as well. It could bring China in conflict with other developing 
countries. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) calculate the extent to which Chinese 
companies are outcompeting their Latin American counterparts. They show that Latin 
America is under a trade threat from China as well. Their analysis finds that 92% of Latin 
America’s manufacturing exports were under threat from China by 2009, representing 
39% of Latin America’s total exports. 
7 When an issue in question has heavy dose of politics, no matter how small the impact 
the issue itself has, it can be amplified and taken out of context making it potential 
implications non-trivial. The Chinese food safety issue in the U.S. is an example. No one 
would deny that China needs to take food safety concern seriously for the sake of both its 
own citizens and consumers elsewhere. However, the issue has enlarged beyond that by 
the politicians and the media due to the trade imbalance between the two countries.   12
Moreover, China can be partly, if not equally, charged as guilty as the others. 
While China never admits any wrongdoing and states that it will join international efforts 
to tackle illegal logging and timber trade, Greenpeace (2006) and Environmental 
Investigation Agency (2005) have criticized China for the responsibility of illegal logging 
and deforestation in the Paradise Forests of Asia Pacific, which stretch from Southeast 
Asia across the islands of Indonesia and on towards Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands in the Pacific. Their investigations reveal that such an illegal logging and 
deforestation is driven by China’s imports of a huge amount of timber for making timber 
products for its own use and exports to satisfy the rising, global demand for inexpensive 
wood products (Reuters 2007). Existing studies on CO2 emissions embodied in trade only 
consider energy-related CO2 emissions, and do not factor in the contributions of land use 
change and forests to CO2 emissions. If the later factors are brought into equation, then 
China’s act arguably reduces these countries’ capacity to use forests as a sink to absorb 
global carbon and increases the CO2 emissions embodied in its imports.  
Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions further complicates current 
debate on the legitimacy of carbon tariffs. The U.S. legislators proposed to use border 
adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the 
U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime to level the carbon playing field. In the U.S. House 
of Representatives, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2998) 
(U.S. House of Representatives 2009), sponsored by Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and 
Edward Markey (D-MA), was narrowly passed on 26 June 2009. The so-called Waxman–
Markey bill requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions allowances 
corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries that have 
not taken climate actions comparable to that of the importing country. This carbon tariff 
proposal has drawn fierce criticism from China and India. Without specific reference to 
the U.S. or the Waxman–Markey bill, China’s Ministry of Commerce said in a statement 
posted on its website that proposals to impose carbon tariffs on imported products will 
violate the rules of the WTO. That would enable developed countries to “resort to trade in 
the name of protecting the environment”. The carbon tariff proposal runs against the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This will neither help strengthen confidence that the international community can 
cooperate to handle the (economic) crisis, nor help any country’s endeavors during the 
climate change negotiations. Thus, China is strongly opposed to it (MOC of China 2009). 
A World Bank study by Mattoo et al. (2009) shows that such a carbon tariff would cut 
China’s manufacturing exports by 21% and India’s by 16%. No wonder that China and 
India warned angrily of trade wars if such border adjustment taxes were imposed (The 
Economist 2009a). However, if the consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions, 
either implicitly or explicitly, is to indicate that the responsibility for the CO2 emissions 
from the production of traded goods and services lies with the consumers in importing 
countries, it can then be argued that the final responsibility for regulating those CO2 
emissions lies with the governments of importing countries.
8 Given that most carbon-
                                                 
8 This is just one of the arguments for carbon tariffs. There are many factors that need to 
be considered in order to ensure that trade measures would withstand a challenge by 
trading partners before the WTO. See Zhang (2009, 2010b and 2011c) for detailed 
discussion on the WTO scrutiny of emissions allowance requirements under a cap-and-  13
intensive industries in the U.S. run a substantial trade deficit, this proposed EAR clearly 
aims to level the carbon playing field for domestic producers and importers. 
  Furthermore, this type of thinking ignores the dynamics of China’s future 
development. For decades, China’s blistering growth has depended on exports and 
investment. The Chinese leaders have recognized that this capital-intensive, export-
oriented growth model is no longer sustainable. Accordingly, China’s current 12
th five-
year economic plan (2011-2015) focuses on rebalancing an export-driven economy. As a 
result, the Chinese economy is becoming more oriented towards the domestic market and 
China is moving to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly and more broadly 
against the currencies of all its trading partners. China has also adopted the concept of 
inclusive growth to seek to ensure equal access to opportunities and balance economic 
and social development with environmental costs. In the domestic context, inclusive 
growth means that China’s economic and social development should guarantee a higher 
standards of living for its people, which requires changing its current low wage or 
practice to keep the costs of labor low in order to boost its exports. With all these changes 
gradually taking place, China will rely less on trade to drive its economic growth. As 
would be expected, the share of China’s carbon emissions embedded in exports is 
expected to fall over time. 
Finally, attributing emissions to consumers advocates the idea on who consumes 
is responsible for pollution from consumed goods. If one accepts this consumers pay 
principle and takes it into broad context, arguably it is rich people who are high emitters 
and therefore are responsible for emissions in their countries. Following this logic, each 
country would then have the task of reducing its national consumption according to its 
number of high emitters - people with an extravagant output of carbon (The Economist 
2009b). If the goal were to cap CO2 emissions at 30 billion tons in 2030 and the personal 
emissions target would be set at around 10.8 tons of CO2 emissions per year, that would 
mean squeezing the behavior of some 1.1 billion high emitters worldwide. China would 
have 300 millions of people over this level by 2030, meaning that the country’s carbon 
emissions should rise to no more than 8.5 billion tons in 2030, in comparison with the 
11.4 billion tons projected under the business as usual scenario (Chakravarty et al. 2009). 
Currently, this is just a fresh thinking, and has not been considered the main stream 
thinking of allocating national emissions targets. However, if a consumption basis is 
pushed too far, then the idea of basing the number of high emitters to determine allowed 
national emissions levels may gain its relevance. If this is the case, then the increasing 
number of high-living, carbon-guzzling rich Chinese people would not be able to hide 
behind their poor and carbon-thrifty compatriots anymore and, as the aforementioned 
results suggest, China would be asked to take on emissions caps even earlier and more 
stringent than China would wish.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
trade regime proposed in the Lieberman–Warner bill in the U.S. Senate and in the 
Waxman–Markey bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, whether an EAR threat 
would be effective as an inducement for major emerging economies to take climate 
actions that they would otherwise not, and methodological challenges in implementing 
EAR.   14
4. Implications of China’s CO2 emissions embodied in trade 
China has put a variety of national policies to boost industry and trade. These policies 
should be responsible for the resulting CO2 emissions. In comparison with other countries 
at its income level, China has an unusually large share of energy-intensive industrial 
production and an unusually small share of the less energy-intensive service sector. For 
example, 49% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 originated from the 
industry sector and 40% from the service sector, while the corresponding figures for India 
were 29% and 54%, respectively. Moreover, the differing composition of industry affects 
the levels of energy intensity. China has a larger share of energy-intensive manufacturing 
in industry than that in India, with manufacturing contributing to 34% of China’s GDP in 
2008 relative to the corresponding 16% for India (World Bank 2010).
9 In recognition of 
the negative implications of its industry-oriented economy structure, China sets the target 
to reduce the share of industry and increase the share of services in its GDP in the 11
th 
five-year economic plan period running from 2006 to 2010. Accordingly, the Chinese 
government has taken great efforts towards changing the current energy-inefficient and 
environmentally-unfriendly pattern of industrial growth. With a surge in energy use in 
heavy industry, the Ministry of Finance of China and the State Administration of 
Taxation started levying export taxes from November 2006 on a variety of energy- and 
resource-intensive products to discourage exports of those products that rely heavily on 
energy and resources, to help save scarce energy and resources. This included a 5% 
export tax on oil, coal and coke; a 10% tax on non-ferrous metals, some minerals and 27 
other iron and steel products; and a 15% tax charged on copper, nickel, aluminum and 
other metallurgical products. Simultaneously, import tariffs on a range of items, including 
26 energy and resource products such as oil, coal and aluminum, were cut from their 
existing levels of 3–6% to 0–3%. From 1 July 2007, the Ministry of Finance of China and 
the State Administration of Taxation (2007) eliminated or cut export tax rebates for 2831 
exported items. This was considered as the boldest move to rein in exports since China 
joined the WTO in December 2001. Among the affected items, which account for 37% of 
all traded products, were 553 ‘highly energy-consuming, highly-polluting and resource-
intensive products’, such as cement, fertilizer and non-ferrous metals, whose export tax 
rebates were completely eliminated. This policy helps to enhance energy efficiency and 
rationalize energy- and resource-intensive sectors as well as controlling soaring exports 
and deflating the ballooning trade surplus. It will also help to control China’s CO2 
emissions in exports. 
From the point of view of leveling the carbon cost playing field, such export taxes 
increase the price at which energy-intensive products made in China, such as steel and 
aluminum, are traded in world markets. For the EU and U.S. producers, such export taxes 
imposed by their major trading partner on these products take out at least part, if not all, 
of the competitive pressure that is at the heart of the carbon leakage debates. Being 
converted into the implicit carbon costs, the estimated levels of CO2 price embedded in 
the Chinese export taxes on steel and aluminium are very much in the same range as the 
                                                 
9 Given that China’s GDP was 3.5–4.0 times that of India in 2008 (World Bank 2010), 
this suggests that, in volume terms, energy-intensive manufacturing in China values 7–8 
times that of India. Clearly, carbon tariffs have a greater impact on China than on India 
(Zhang 2010b).   15
average price of the EU allowances over the same period. Zhang (2009, 2010b and 
2011c) have argued that there is a clear need within a climate regime to define 
comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of 
unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified by export tariffs that 
China applied voluntarily during 2006–2008, defining the comparability of climate 
efforts can be to China’s advantage (Zhang 2010b). 
These policies brought positive outcomes, but are not enough. In the end, China 
failed to reach its own set goals of economic restructuring in 2010. To control the growth 
of its increasing demand for energy and oil imports as well as China’s CO2 emissions in 
exports, China needs to strengthen its efforts to keep the expansion of inefficient and 
highly polluting industries under control and to implement its own set industrial 
restructuring and sustainable development policies. 
China also needs to adjust its current trade structure. Processing trade involves 
importing goods and re-exporting the imported goods after being processed. Since the 
processing trade policy was implemented in late 1970s, the processing trade in China has 
been developing in a sustained and rapid manner; the total volume of exports and imports 
in the form of processing trade increased from US$ 2.5 billion in 1981 to US$ 831.9 
billion in 2006, up by nearly 333 times. Its proportion in total foreign trade increased 
from 5.7% to 48.6% during this period. While its share has dropped in recent years, 
processing trade has still accounted for more than 41% of China’s total trade. Based on 
panel data covering China’s 51 trading partners from 1993–2008, Xin (2011) shows that 
processing trade accounts for 100% of China’s overall trade surplus and can explain most 
of its bilateral trade balances. However, no matter how useful it is in promoting the 
development and job creation, China needs to upgrade the processing trade. This is 
considered essential not only to deepening China’s opening-up and maintaining its 
international competitive edge, but also to improving the environment and limiting CO2 
emissions.  
The Chinese government clearly recognizes the importance. In addition to 
supportive economic policies and market-based environmental instruments, governments 
are exploring industrial policies to promote industrial upgrading and energy conservation. 
Ministry of Commerce of China and the State Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 
in October 2007 were in an unusual collaboration to jointly issue the antipollution 
circular. Targeted at the booming export industry, this new regulation would suspend the 
rights of those enterprises that do not meet their environmental obligations to engage 
foreign trade in the period of more than one year and less than three years. A significant 
portion of China’s air pollution can be traced directly to the production of goods that are 
exported. In the Pearl River Delta, a major manufacturing region in Southern China, as 
indicated in Figure 4, Streets et al. (2006) found that 37% of the total SO2 emissions in 
the region, 28% of NOx, 24% of particulate matter (PM), and 8% of volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) are caused by export-related activities. In the city of Shenzhen alone, 
the regional leader in industrial development and trade, 75% of VOCs, 71% of PM, 91% 
of NOx, and 89% of SO2 emissions from the industrial sector were released in the 
manufacturing of exported goods. Effectively implemented, this policy should help 
polluting enterprises that export their products to pay attention to the environmental 















Figure 4 Percentage of air pollutants tied to export manufacturing in the Pearl 
River Delta and Shenzhen, China 
Source: Streets et al. (2006). 
 
Cutting China’s CO2 emissions in exports creates a new impetus for upgrading its 
energy mix. China has relied on coal for about 70% of its total energy consumption over 
the past decades to fuel its rapidly growing economy. Therefore, the amount of CO2 
emissions in China and from the production of Chinese exports is attributed to this coal-
dominated energy mix in China. If the country could significantly cut the share of coal in 
its energy mix, then the amount of CO2 emissions in China and from the production of 
Chinese exports would be reduced dramatically, even if it would remain the largest 
carbon emitter in the world. A country’s choice of fuels and technologies depends to a 
large extent on its resource endowments and their relative prices. The fact that countries 
like China and India use more coal is not because they prefer it, but because of their 
abundant supplies of coal and its relatively lower price compared with its more 
environmentally friendly substitutes. The trade-related emissions issue has created a new 
impetus for encouraging the use of renewables and improving energy efficiency. 
Increasing this share not only enhances energy security, but also is environmentally 
friendly and conducive to good health. China had made great efforts in this area and has 
already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the use of clean 
energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, making further credible quantified 
domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period and beyond. 
Taking many factors into consideration, Zhang (2010c, 2011b,c) argue that China needs 
to take on absolute emissions caps around 2030. However, it is hard to imagine how   17
China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to 
immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. To that 
end, Zhang (2010c, 2011b,c) envision that China needs the following three transitional 
periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps that 
will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050: first, further credible 
energy conservation commitments starting in 2013 and aimed at cutting China’s carbon 
intensity by 46-50% by 2020 (Zhang 2011a); second, voluntary “no lose” emission 
targets starting in 2018; and third, binding carbon intensity targets as its international 
commitment starting in 2023. Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting 
China’s rights to grow and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions as China is approaching to be the world’s largest economy. 
Cutting China’s CO2 emissions in production of goods for domestic consumption 
and exports also requires increasing corporate social responsibility. While governments 
determine the rules under which businesses act, set environmental goals and commit to 
international environmental agreements, they count on enterprises’ full cooperation. After 
all, the enterprises themselves are entities that make investment, use natural resources, 
produce products and emit pollution. Foreign-invested enterprises have played a vital role 
in boosting China’s trade. They have produced more than half of its exports, and have 
dominated in its exports of electronics and information and communication technology, 
accounting for more than 80% of China’s exports of these goods (Xin 2011). They 
accordingly contribute to an increase in CO2 emissions produced in production of their 
products for exports. Given that foreign-invested enterprises, in particular multilateral 
corporations have financial resources and advanced technologies and management, they 
are well positioned to set good examples for local Chinese enterprises, including the 
compliance with environmental regulations standards. Their policies and strategies have 
huge implications for others, in particular their suppliers. For example, until 2008 Wal-
Mart had adopted the “always low prices” as its slogan. While it benefits consumers by 
keeping prices low, this practice comes at the cost of the environment. Keeping prices 
low will put pressure on its suppliers, in particular those small suppliers, and squeeze 
their profit margins. While multilateral corporations state that they are committed to the 
high standards of social responsibility, keeping artificially low prices throughout their 
supply base leaves their suppliers little or no room to internalize their externality costs. 
Some have even no choice but to disregard the environment to win orders from 
multilateral corporations. Recently, Chinese environmental groups have accused Apple 
suppliers for pollution in China (Hook and Hille 2011). This is partly attributed to Apple 
low purchasing price in its supply chain. Moreover, some transnational corporations 
operate with double environmental standards, adopting low standards in their subsidiaries 
in developing countries where there is the absence or lack of industry-specific national 
standards or the implementation of these standards are weak, although they are capable of 
improving the environmental performance of their subsidiaries. It has been widely 
reported that over one hundred of multilateral corporations in China were blacklisted for 
being noncompliance with China’s environmental regulations (Sina Net 2008). This is not 
in China alone. It is also in other developing countries, including those more advanced 
developing countries. Focusing on the rapidly developing electronics assembly industry 
in the three border cities, Juárez, Mexicali and Tijuana in North Mexico, Schatan and 
Castilleja (2007) found that 89% of the plants surveyed are foreign owned and many of   18
their parent companies had introduced significant environmental measures in their 
countries of origin. However, only slightly over half of the plants analyzed had 




China’s capital-intensive, export-oriented, spectacular economic growth since launching 
its open-door policy and economic reforms in late 1978 not only has created jobs and has 
lifted hundreds of millions of the Chinese people out of poverty, but also has given rise to 
unprecedented environmental pollution and CO2 emissions. Estimates of the embedded 
CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ, depending on the boundary assumed in the 
calculation of embedded CO2 emissions, the choice of methodology and the treatment of 
technology and emission intensity data across trading partners. Measured as a percentage 
of total CO2 emissions produced in China, global studies based on more accurate country 
trade flow and technology details tend to give a lower estimate of the embedded CO2 
emissions than those single country study for China, which may fail to capture potentially 
large national differences in technology levels between China and its trading partners. 
However, both types of studies show that a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 emissions are 
embedded in trade. This portion of CO2 emissions had helped to turn China into the 
world’s largest CO2 emitter, and is further widening its gap with the second largest 
emitter.  
Who should be responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon 
cost of exports is a very sensitive and complex issue. China certainly wants importers to 
cover some, if not all, of the costs of that. China’s stance is understandable. Pointing this 
out at least helps to have a better understanding of China’s emissions and their 
contributions and bridge the gap between the concerns of China and developed countries. 
However, if this is pushed too far, this paper has argued from a broad and balanced 
perspective that on the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage for several reasons.  
First, China as the workshop of the world is largely the result of a comparative 
advantage in the division of trade. Using less energy-efficient technologies to produce 
goods for domestic use and exports is also largely dictated by its current stage of 
development. It is fair to say that rapidly rising carbon emissions and emissions 
embedded in exports are also the results of China’s deliberate, pro-trade policies. China 
has not only adopted the common pro-trade policies, such as the depressed exchange rate 
and export tax rebates, but has long used access to its unique giant customer base and 
accesses to its certain raw materials and rare earth elements as leverage to induce foreign 
companies to open factories in China or relocate their production to China. China not 
only has been criticized for keeping its currency artificially low, but also has confronted 
with many disputes with its trading partners, including the auto part tariffs, the local 
content requirement for wind power projects, the export quotas on nine metal ores and 
other raw materials, and the export quotas on rare earths. If one follows China’s argument 
that these are European and American emissions from China’s own deliberate pro-trade 
policies, then it can be equally argued that these must have been European and American 
jobs. Given that job outsourcing in the current economic crisis is extremely sensitive in 
the U.S. and EU, this does not do any good for China. Combined with the U.S. concerns 
about existing huge trade deficit and further deterioration of its trade balance sheet with   19
China, pushing the responsibility of the consumers in importing countries is definitely a 
tough sell to the U.S. Moreover, this is not just about China versus industrialized 
countries. It has a bearing on developing countries as well. 
Second, China can be partly, if not equally, charged as guilty as the others. While 
China never admits any wrongdoing and states that it will join international efforts to 
tackle illegal logging and timber trade, China has long been criticized for the 
responsibility of illegal logging and deforestation in Southeast Asia, in particular 
Myanmar and Indonesia. Existing studies on CO2 emissions embodied in trade only 
consider energy-related CO2 emissions, and do not factor in the contributions of land use 
change and forests to CO2 emissions. If the later factors are brought into equation, then 
China’s act arguably reduces these countries’ capacity to use forests as a sink to absorb 
global carbon and increases the CO2 emissions embodied in its imports.  
Third, consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions further complicates 
current debate on the legitimacy of carbon tariffs. The U.S. proposed carbon tariffs have 
drawn fierce criticism from China and India. However, if the consumption-based 
accounting of CO2 emissions, either implicitly or explicitly, is to indicate that the 
responsibility for the CO2 emissions from the production of traded goods and services 
lies with the consumers in importing countries, it can then be argued that the final 
responsibility for regulating those CO2 emissions lies with the governments of importing 
countries. 
  Fourth, this type of thinking ignores the dynamics of China’s future development. 
The savvy Chinese leaders have recognized that China’s capital-intensive, export-
oriented growth model over the past decades is no longer sustainable. Accordingly, 
China’s current 12
th five-year economic plan focuses on rebalancing an export-driven 
economy and inclusive growth, aiming for reliance less on trade and more on domestic 
consumption to drive its economic growth. As would be expected, the share of China’s 
carbon emissions embedded in exports is expected to fall over time. 
Fifth, attributing emissions to consumers advocates the idea on who consumes is 
responsible for pollution from consumed goods. If one takes this consumers pay principle 
into broad context, arguably it is rich people who are high emitters and therefore are 
responsible for emissions in their countries. Provided that the idea of basing the number 
of high emitters to determine allowed national emissions levels would gain its relevance, 
then the increasing number of high-living, carbon-guzzling rich Chinese people would 
not be able to hide behind their poor and carbon-thrifty compatriots anymore and China 
would accordingly be asked to take on emissions caps even earlier and more stringent 
than China would wish.  
  While the aforementioned reasons argue that China is responsible for its carbon 
emissions embodied in exports, it does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on 
domestic actions, no actions at the international level. In fact, to effectively control the 
embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade, actions need to be taken internationally as 
well as domestically. At the national level, China needs to focus on rebalancing its 
investment-driven, export-oriented economy, boosting the service sector and domestic 
consumption and allowing its currency to appreciate more rapidly and more broadly to 
reflect its real value. In this regard, it is crucial for China to take significant efforts to 
keep the expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries under control and to 
implement its own set industrial restructuring and sustainable development policies.   20
China also needs to adjust its current trade structure. Processing trade has played a 
significant role in promoting development and job creation in China. However, no matter 
how useful it is, China needs to upgrade the processing trade. This is considered essential 
not only to deepening China’s opening-up and maintaining its international competitive 
edge, but also to improving the environment and limiting CO2 emissions in production of 
goods for exports as well as for domestic consumption. 
Cutting China’s CO2 emissions in exports creates a new impetus for upgrading its 
energy mix and improving energy efficiency. China had made great efforts in this area 
and has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation, the use of 
clean energy and carbon intensity. It needs to extend its level of ambition, aiming for a 
46–50% cut in its carbon intensity by 2020 and taking on absolute emissions caps around 
2030 that will lead to the global convergence of per capita CO2 emissions by 2050. With 
rising domestic energy demand and increasing difficulty further cutting energy and 
carbon intensities, putting a price on carbon is considered a crucial step for China’s 
endeavor of harnessing the market force to reduce its energy consumption and carbon 
emissions and genuinely transiting into a low-carbon economy. It will make consumers, 
be in China or abroad, to bear the carbon costs. China is experimenting low-carbon 
provinces and low-carbon cities in five provinces and eight cities. Aligned with such 
experiment, a carbon tax or a domestic carbon trading scheme, if established, will serve 
as a cost-effective supplement to costly administrative means on which China has mainly 
relied to meet its energy-saving goal in 2010. However, in terms of timing, given that 
China has not levied environmental taxes yet, it is better to introduce environmental taxes 
first, followed by carbon taxes, not least because such a distinction will enable to 
disentangle China’s additional efforts towards carbon abatement from those broad 
energy-saving and pollution-cutting ones. In case of a domestic carbon trading scheme, 
the key issue is its scope and coverage. Given the fact that the costs of abating carbon 
emissions differ significantly among emissions sources across provinces and sectors, 
having broad coverage of emissions sources from all industries nationwide creates a 
means of obtaining low-cost abatement options, thus minimizing the total cost of 
complying with the national energy-saving and emissions goals. This is an ideal option. 
In practice, however, carbon trading in China would have to start from selected sectors or 
regions, although the limited scope and coverage will reduce its cost-effectiveness, 
because China needs a reasonable length of time to develop and operate a national carbon 
market. Moreover, to facilitate future integration of these fragmented sectoral or regional 
schemes into a national emissions trading scheme, the central government should 
establish from the outset the common standards for any sectoral or regional schemes to be 
established and implement them strictly.   
As experienced in China and elsewhere, even if multilateral corporations, which 
have financial resources and advanced technologies and management and thus are well 
positioned to set good examples for local enterprises, operate with double environmental 
standards, adopting low standards in their subsidiaries in developing countries. Quite a 
few even do not comply with China’s environmental regulations. Clearly, cutting China’s 
CO2 emissions in production of goods for exports as well as for domestic consumption 
requires strengthening the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations 
and standards. This will prod companies to take increasing corporate social responsibility.   21
 Just like any country that will concern about the potential competitiveness loss of 
unilateral imposition of carbon prices, China is no exception. At the international level, 
cutting China’s CO2 emissions in exports therefore creates a new impetus for 
strengthening international coordination on climate change and establishing a global 
carbon price framework. It is the absence of a global carbon price that has failed to 
internalize the carbon costs. Given that the internalization of carbon costs will send a 
clear signal to both producers and consumers, therefore China and the international 
community need to strengthen coordination in the internalization of the carbon costs, 
ensuring that the costs of carbon emissions embodied in traded goods be reflected in the 
price to the consuming countries as well as those goods for domestic use. This is a 
feasible means of passing through a carbon cost to consumers without consumption-
based accounting of CO2 emissions, which is more data-intensive and complex than 
production-based accounting of CO2 emissions. In this course, China needs to increase its 
domestic carbon prices and support more stringent global greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions to bring about higher, more consistent carbon prices internationally. Moreover, 
China is still a developing country, no matter how rapidly it is growing. Industrialized 
countries should significantly scale up their technology transfer and deployment, 
financing and capacity building to encourage and enable China to undertake more 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions than would otherwise have been the case. 
Industrialized countries have promised new and additional climate finance at the 
Copenhagen climate change conference. While their climate finance pledges are well 
below expectations and demands from developing countries, industrialized countries have 
to date failed to keep their climate finance pledges (Ballesteros et al. 2011). Given that 
developing countries have explicitly linked progress in climate finance commitments 
from industrialized countries with many other issues in international climate change 
negotiations, the failure to deliver their pledges will not help build trust with their 
developing country counterparts and break current impasses in international climate 
change negotiations. While China has determined to deal with its own unprecedented 
environmental pollution and rising greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels 
and energy security as a result of steeply rising oil imports, international support is still 
crucial to enabling China to accelerate its future development along a more sustainable 
path. Given the coal-dominated energy mix in China, this also means that larger amounts 
of greenhouse gas emissions in production of goods both for domestic consumption and 
exports will be avoided than would otherwise have been the case. This helps to mitigate 
global climate change. Clearly, this is the win-win outcome both for China and global 
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